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Abstract
This paper discusses the level and design of support schemes used to pro-
mote renewable electricity in Europe. A theoretical model is presented to de-
termine optimal renewable energy policies. Policies that solely aim to address
environmental externalities and energy security risks are unlikely to make re-
newable power technologies competitive. Learning e⁄ects and spillovers are
necessary to justify the need for support schemes. The analysis suggests that
feed-in premiums guaranteed in addition to the electricity market price should
be preferred over feed-in tari⁄s, which provide the eligible power producer with
a guaranteed price. The premiums should be time limited and frequently re-
viewed. Once the technology becomes competitive, tradable green certi￿cates
would be a more suitable support instrument. As regards wind energy, the
available estimates of externalities suggest that levels are probably too high
in many Member States. In addition, the current promotion of photovoltaics
could possibly be more cost-e¢ cient if it targeted technology development
more directly.
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31 Introduction
The Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable energy sources
was one major part of the Energy and Climate package agreed by the Council in
December 2008. The promotion of renewable energy aims at (i) reducing CO2-
emissions, (ii) diversifying the energy mix and thereby improving energy security,
while at the same time (iii) contributing to the competitiveness and growth of the
EU economy through technological development and the development of a new in-
dustry. In other words, this policy aims at addressing the externalities related to
environmental damage, energy security risks, and knowledge spill-overs. The new
Renewable Directive creates a regulatory framework for achieving a share of 20%
renewable energy in EU energy consumption by 2020. It sets national renewable tar-
gets for Member States, taking account of di⁄erent starting points and potentials,
as well as di⁄erences in GDP.
The policy instruments applied to promote the introduction of renewable energy
sources remain, however, the competence of Member States. This note focuses on
these policy instruments, and in particular on the features of the most common
systems, that is, feed-in tari⁄s, feed-in premiums and green certi￿cation/obligation
systems. One objective of this paper is to assess the support levels in relation to the
above-mentioned externalities. Another objective is to look at how these systems
can be designed as e¢ ciently as possible considering the ambitious renewable policy
target. The note discusses various implementation issues related to these schemes,
including the issue of harmonisation, compatibility with the internal electricity mar-
ket as well as the sequencing of instruments.
The note is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the current state of play as
regards the share of renewables and expected production cost developments. Section
3 describes the model and discusses the level of support schemes when considering
the di⁄erent externalities. Section 4 focuses on the design of support schemes and
covers the issue of uncertainty, trade and the impact on the internal market. Finally,
section 5 is an economic assessment of current support schemes in Member States,
based on the considerations previously analysed. Section 6 concludes by recalling
the main policy recommendations of the paper.
2 Market share and production cost developments
In 2007, the overall EU share of renewables in the energy mix was 7.8%, while nearly
17% of the EU electricity production originated from renewable energy sources1.
1The de￿nition of renewable energy applied in EU energy statistics includes hydropower, wind
energy, solar energy, biomass and wastes, and geothermal energy. The Renewable Directive
(European Commission 2009a) de￿nes it as "energy from renewable non-fossil sources, namely
4Hydro power, a well-established mature technology, accounted for about 10% of
electricity production in the EU. The potential for additional large-scale hydro power
is close to exhaustion at the EU level, and the focus of this note is therefore on the
new innovative renewable technologies. These technologies account for the remaining
7%, which is dominated by power production based on biomass (3%) and wind
(3.1%). The new technologies have experienced a considerable growth in the last 10
years (see ￿gure 1), starting from a very low level. The share of renewable sources
in overall power production is expected to grow considerably not only as a result of
climate and energy policies, but also in the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario due
to existing policies as well as increasing fossil fuel prices over time. The projections
for the implementation of the energy and climate policy estimate that renewable
energy sources will account for 31% of electricity production in 2020 in the EU27.
The corresponding ￿gure for the BAU scenario is 20%2.
The overall use of renewable energy varies considerably across Member States.
The share of renewable energy in power production ranges from around 70% (Aus-
tria) to nil for Cyprus and Malta, or 1.4% for Estonia. The mix of production tech-
nologies also varies signi￿cantly. Figure 2 shows that large scale hydro dominates
renewable electricity generation, but the share of wind electricity is also signi￿cant
in Germany, Denmark and Spain. Small scale hydro is mainly applied in Austria,
Germany, Spain, France and Italy, while solid biomass is applied in Finland, Ger-
many, and Sweden. Biogas, on the other hand, plays a role in particular in Germany
and the UK.
The generation cost of renewable electricity generally remains higher than that
of conventional technologies. Figure 3 presents comparable costs for di⁄erent tech-
nologies in 2007, as well as projections for 2020 and 2030 (see the detailed numbers
presented in Annex 7.1). These projections represent expected learning curves, as
further technology development and more deployment are expected to reduce pro-
duction costs over time (European Commission 2008a). However, there is a question
regarding the causation here, since lower costs would also induce more deployment.
A policy that promotes early deployment could thus run the risk of resulting in lower
than expected learning rates (Stern 2006).
Cost ranges are expressed in e(2005)/MWh, which allows for a comparison of the
economic competitiveness during the life time of the power plant. The comparison is
based on a state-of-the-art facility that is assumed to start operating in the relevant
year. The reported ranges re￿ ect variations in capital costs which depend on speci￿c
wind, solar, aerothermal, geothermal, hydrothermal and ocean energy, hydropower, biomass, land-
￿ll gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogases"(Article 2a). Currently, there can be small
discrepancies between the energy statistics and the coverage of the directive, in particular regard-
ing the inclusion of the di⁄erent types of heat pumps and the treatment of waste. Work is on going
to improve the statistics on renewable energy.












Figure 1: Renewable electricity generation in the 27 EU Member States, TWh per
year (Source: Eurostat, hydropower excluded)
technology choices, plant location and market conditions across the EU3.
It is clear that costs di⁄er substantially depending on the site and local conditions
of the investments, which will have a large impact on the competitiveness vis-￿-vis
conventional power technologies. Biogas, on-shore wind and small-scale hydro have
the potential to compete with nuclear, gas and coal if local conditions are in their
favour. Higher fuel prices would also bene￿t these technologies. Photovoltaic and
o⁄-shore wind farms have the largest potential to reduce costs.
As mentioned above, the cost of producing renewable electricity remains on aver-
age higher than that of conventional technologies, and high in relation to the average
wholesale prices. However, these relative costs do not take account of all the negative
externalities related to the use of conventional power production. Since 2005 the EU
Emission Trading System (ETS), which covers fossil fuel based power generation,
introduces an opportunity cost for power producers on the negative externality of
CO2-emissions. Taking account of these costs improves the competitiveness of re-
newable electricity and creates a level playing ￿eld in this respect. Air pollution as
3The variability related to fuel retail prices is, however, not included in the ranges, but based
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Figure 2: Renewable electricity generation in European Union in 2007, TWh
(Source: Eurostat)
well as other environmental standards similarly add to the generation cost of con-
ventional power. However, despite these rather recent e⁄orts to internalise external
costs, renewable electricity remains more costly than electricity produced with es-
tablished technologies. Various forms of economic support schemes are therefore
applied at national level to support the market introduction of renewable electricity
technologies. The objective is to create economies of scale and allow for further
technology development, which will reduce the costs of these technologies over time
and render them competitive in the longer run. Further diversi￿cation of the fuel
mix, in order to improve the security of supply, is another policy objective. The
most common renewable electricity support schemes include feed-in tari⁄s, feed-in
premiums and green certi￿cates.
Feed-in tari⁄s provide the eligible renewable power producer with a guaranteed
price for the power they feed into the grid. The preferential and technology-speci￿c
tari⁄s are regulated by the government and are normally guaranteed for a period of
10 - 20 years. The electricity is delivered to the grid, where the system operator will
ensure the further distribution of the renewable electricity. Hence, the producers
also face a rather secure demand for their renewable power. The feed-in tari⁄s
thereby reduce both the price and market risk, and create certainty for the investor


























Figure 3: Production cost ranges for di⁄erent electricity technologies, state of the
art 2007, e(2005)/MWh (Source: European Commission, 2008a)
8A feed-in premium provides the producer with a guaranteed premium in addition
to the electricity market price. The preferential and technology-speci￿c premiums
are still determined by the government and the producer still bene￿ts from a secure
demand. However, in this case, the price faced by renewable electricity producers
￿ uctuates according to the changes in the electricity market price.
Green certi￿cates are normally based on a quota obligation. Hence, the govern-
ment imposes an obligation on consumers or suppliers to have a certain percentage
of the electricity sourced from renewable sources. The authorities issue certi￿cates
to producers corresponding to their production of renewable energy, which are sold
separately from the electricity. The quota obligation on electricity suppliers ensures
that there is a demand for certi￿cates, as suppliers will need to buy certi￿cates to
ful￿l their quotas. The main advantage of this system is that it allows competition
between renewable producers as the certi￿cate price will depend on demand and
supply of green certi￿cates.
Feed-in tari⁄s and premiums are currently used by 21 Member States. Six
States apply green certi￿cates, and a few countries are planning to do so in the
future. Other instruments include tenders, grants and various ￿scal support mea-
sures. However, these instruments are often applied as a complement to the other
support systems. The features of feed-in tari⁄s, feed-in premiums and green cer-
ti￿cates are discussed in the next sections on the basis of the externalities they
address.
3 Considerations on the level of support schemes
3.1 The model
Consider the following stylised partial equilibrium model of the electricity sector,
inspired by existing contributions (Fischer & Newell 2008, Lehmann 2009). The
electricity sector encompasses two sub-sectors. One sector uses fossil fuels to gener-
ate electricity, which creates polluting emissions as a by-product. The other sector
employs renewable energy sources. Both sectors are assumed to be competitive and
produce an identical output, electricity.
The model has two periods and there is discounting at rate ￿ between periods.
The fossil-fuel sector uses a technology based on fossil fuel and, to simplify, one
unit of fossil fuel is necessary for one unit of production x. Production costs are
increasing and convex and summarised by the following function: C(xt). Emissions
are assumed to be ￿xed at rate ￿. To avoid excessive complications and without loss
of generality, polluting emissions are limited to the ￿rst period. Total emissions from
the emitting sector are: E1 = ￿x1. Polluting emissions produce damage to society,
which depends on the overall level of emissions: D1(E1). Damage is assumed to be
9increasing and convex. The renewable sector consists of n identical ￿rms, each one
of them producing the same electricity output qt in period t. Individual production
cost in period one is G1(q1). Individual production cost in period two is a function of
output in period two and the total level of learning, or experience, L in period one,
that is, G2(q2;L) (Bl￿si & Requate 2007). Total learning depends on the output
of the ￿rm under consideration and the output of all other identical ￿rms in the
sector: L = q1j + ￿
Pn
i=1;i6=j q1i, which can be simpli￿ed by L = q1 + ￿(n ￿ 1)q1 as
￿rms are identical and produce the same output level. Note that the second part
of this equation is considered as given by individual producers. The spillover rate
￿ indicates to which extent a ￿rm can bene￿t from the experience made by other
￿rms. Production costs in each period are increasing and convex. Production cost
in period two is declining and convex in learning. Learning also reduces marginal
production cost in period 2. Production cost in period 2 is assumed to be convex
overall.4
Total output of the electricity sector in period t is the sum of electricity generated
in the fossil-fuel sector and the renewables sector: Qt = xt + nqt. In equilibrium,
electricity output equals electricity demand. The inverse demand function is given
by Pt = Pt(Qt), with P 0
t(Qt) < 0. We assume that P 0
t(Qt) +P 00
t (Qt)Qt < 0, implying
that the inverse demand function is not too convex.
In the context of this model, energy security is also a source of externality. There
exists an energy mix, which consists of an optimal share s* of renewable-based
electricity, that would minimise the risk of energy insecurity. Any other energy mix
induces the chance of a positive and increasing damage S1(x1;nq1). Again, to limit
excessive complications and to facilitate comparisons, the energy security issue is
limited to the ￿rst period.
Total welfare includes consumer surplus, electricity producers￿pro￿ts and dam-








P2(Q2) ￿ C(x2) ￿ nG2(q2;L))
4It would be possible to further account for the vertical structure of the renewable power
industry by considering an upstream industry of oligopolistic renewable power equipment producers
engaged in learning by doing (Reichenbach & Requate 2009). This would also require making a
distinction between learning-by-doing in the renewable energy equipment industry or in renewable
electricity production. The main di⁄erences originate from e⁄ects on international trade, since
the output of the machinery and equipment sector is intensively traded on international markets
unlike renewable electricity (Schumacher & Kohlhaas 2007). However, this extension is considered
unnecessary in this simpli￿ed context.
103.1.1 The social optimum
Welfare is optimised with respect to the level of production for the fossil-fuel sector






























1(E1) is the derivative of the environmental damage function with re-
spect to environmental emissions and @S1=@x1 is the partial derivative of the energy
security damage function with respect to the production of fossil-fuel based electric-
ity. Other derivatives adopt the same conventions.
These equations present the conditions for a socially optimal allocation of re-
sources. Welfare is optimised when the price of electricity, or the consumers￿mar-
ginal willingness to pay, is equal to its marginal cost. The marginal cost of electricity
is measured as the marginal private production cost plus any marginal social cost
associated with the production of electricity. This holds both true for the fossil-
fuel based electricity sub-sector as well as for the renewable-energy based electricity
sub-sector.
3.1.2 Introducing feed-in tari⁄s
The design of feed-in tari⁄s deviates from that of a traditional subsidy in some
respects. First, it takes the form of a guaranteed price as producers of electricity
receive a ￿xed feed-in tari⁄ ￿ per unit of electricity produced in period 1. Unlike
traditional subsidies, the tari⁄is not funded through the government budget but by
the system operators through an add-on ’1 to the electricity price in period one.
The add-on is determined endogenously and amounts to the feed-in tari⁄ times the




In a competitive market, electricity producers take this add-on as given.
5We made the necessary assumption on demand and cost curves to ensure that the problem
was globally convex, that is second order conditions are always satis￿ed.
113.1.3 Introducing tradable green certi￿cates
Tradable green certi￿cates set a target for the share of renewables in the overall
consumption of electricity. The producers of green energy have the right to issue
green certi￿cates. The market for green certi￿cates determines their price. Let ￿
be the share of renewables in the overall consumption. Let ￿1 denote the market
clearing price of certi￿cates. The add-on  1 to the electricity price paid by consumers
is then:
(7)  1 = ￿1￿
Under perfect information, the two policies bring identical results, that is, we
must have: ’1 =  1, and more speci￿cally ￿ = ￿1 and
nq1
Q1 = ￿. The only di⁄erence
between the two policies is that in the case of a feed-in tari⁄, the share of renewables
(quantity, i.e. ￿) is endogenous whereas in the case of green certi￿cates, the add-on
price is endogenous.
The remainder of this section focuses on the determination of optimal feed-in
tari⁄s. Similar results could be derived for green certi￿cates. Di⁄erent scenarios
are considered, according to assumptions made on the number of externalities that
the regulator faces, as well as on the number of available policy instruments. The
objective of this approach is to introduce gradually the treatment of the di⁄erent
externalities.
3.2 Pollution
3.2.1 Using renewable support schemes to address an environmental
externality
Let us consider ￿rst that the only externality that needs to be internalised by the
regulator is the pollution one. Standard environmental economics theory states that
a Pigovian tax would in this context be optimal, that is, an environmental tax on
polluting emissions whose rate would be equal to the marginal social damage of
emissions. Here, it is considered that a renewable support scheme is used to address




P1(Q1) ￿ C(x1) ￿ nG1(q1) ￿ D1(E1)
6Note that there is no need to consider the second period as, under this set of assumptions,
there are no possible interactions between the two periods.
12The optimal feed-in tari⁄ is determined by backward induction, that is, ￿rst by
determining optimal production levels given the tari⁄and then by solving the regu-
lator￿ s welfare maximisation problem. Details of the calculations, for this subsection
as well as for the other ones, are provided in Annex 8.1. The optimal feed-in tari⁄
under this scenario is:
(9) ￿
￿








This equation simply states that the optimal tari⁄should be equal to the price of
electricity plus a mark-up. Recall that
dx1
d￿ < 0 and therefore, the second part of the
right-hand side of this equation is positive. This mark-up consists of the marginal
social damage of polluting emissions times the impact of a change in the feed-in tari⁄
on the relative levels of electricity production. The following proposition summarises
the results.
Proposition 1 An optimal feed-in tari⁄ internalising a pollution externality should
be chosen above the electricity market price. The optimal mark-up is lower than the
marginal damage of emissions.
Proof: under our assumptions on the demand curve and the production cost







Two major considerations can be derived from this result. First, the regulator
uses the feed-in tari⁄ to modify polluters￿behaviour. The only way to do so is to
choose a feed-in tari⁄above the electricity market price so as to increase the share of
renewables and decrease production by fossil-fuel based electricity producers. The
problem with this approach is that such a renewable support scheme would not
give the right incentives to the renewables sector. In this speci￿c example, we have
considered that the renewables sector creates no speci￿c externality. Thus, there
is no reason to distort the price faced by renewable electricity producers. What is
optimal for the fossil-fuel sector is not optimal for the renewables sector. Hence,
it is more e¢ cient to directly address the emissions in the fossil-fuel sector than
subsidising the renewables energy sector so as to indirectly in￿ uence, via a change
in the market price, ￿rms using fossil fuel sources. It is more e¢ cient to address an
externality as close as possible to its source.
Second, one could question whether such a feed-in tari⁄ would be su¢ cient to
promote renewable electricity production, given the important di⁄erences in pro-
duction costs between conventional and renewable energy sources. This is discussed
in more detail below.
133.2.2 External costs and the competitiveness of renewable electricity
The CASES research project (CASES 2009) provides estimates for several types
of environmental externalities, and provides data on production costs, including
external costs, for various technologies. This project aims to identify the full costs of
electricity generation. Although some of the assumptions made could be challenged,
the range of results remains of the same magnitude as the costs presented in section
2 and o⁄ers a good basis for discussion. Figure 4 summarises the results of the
project (see as well Figure 9 in Annex 7.1).
The results for the current period (2005-2010) show that renewable electricity
produced with on-shore wind technology is close to being competitive as compared
to electricity produced with fossil-fuel sources, while hydropower is slightly more
expensive, provided that externalities are taken into account. Note that this is to a
large extent explained by the high cost associated with GHG emissions (measured
in the CASES project by the marginal abatement cost of GHG emissions)7. Other
renewable energy sources are, on the other hand, not yet competitive vis-￿-vis con-
ventional energy sources. This also means that a support scheme only internalising
the environmental externality would not be su¢ cient to cover the costs of most re-
newable energy sources. In other words, the environmental externality only cannot
justify current support schemes. The following policy conclusion summarizes our
results.
Policy conclusion 1 Policies that solely aim to internalise environmental exter-
nalities are unlikely to make renewable power technologies competitive. Further-
more, it is more e¢ cient to apply the policy instruments directly at the emission
source rather than to support alternative clean technologies. Other considerations
are therefore needed to justify policies supporting renewable energy production.
3.3 Energy security
With both energy consumption and dependence on oil and gas imports growing,
the risk of supply failures is rising, setting a shadow price on some energy sources.
The EU has decided to promote a broad mix of energy sources. Renewable energy
sources have a role to play in this regard as they can contribute to a more diversi￿ed




P1(Q1) ￿ C(x1) ￿ nG1(q1) ￿ S1(nq1;x1)
7Combined heat and power production based on biomass is also competitive, but excluded from
this discussion as it requires a demand and a distribution network for the heat.





















biomass (woodchips) CHP with an extraction condensing turbine 1,79 1,13 0,66 1,80 0,98 0,82 1,97 0,98 0,99
nuclear power plant 3,32 3,10 0,22 2,76 2,62 0,14 2,40 2,28 0,12
hard coal CHP with backpressure turbine 3,88 0,89 2,99 4,19 0,91 3,28 5,25 1,04 4,21
hard coal CHP with extraction condensing turbine without CO2 capture 4,07 1,31 2,76 4,31 1,34 2,97 5,21 1,39 3,82
hard coal CHP with extraction condensing turbine with CO2 capture 4,07 1,31 2,76 4,26 3,12 1,14 4,48 3,09 1,39
biomass (straw) CHP with an extraction condensing turbine 4,61 2,59 2,02 4,37 2,18 2,19 4,80 2,18 2,62
lignite IGCC without CO2 capture 5,38 3,00 2,38 4,96 2,83 2,13 5,68 2,77 2,91
lignite IGCC with CO2 capture 5,38 3,00 2,38 4,15 3,39 0,76 4,28 3,34 0,94
natural gas CHP with extraction condensing turbine without CO2 capture 5,39 4,12 1,27 5,72 4,37 1,35 6,17 4,40 1,77
natural gas CHP with extraction condensing turbine with CO2 capture 5,39 4,12 1,27 7,22 6,37 0,85 7,36 6,32 1,04
lignite condensing power plant 5,65 2,68 2,97 5,15 2,18 2,97 6,07 2,14 3,93
natural gas combined cycle CHP with backpressure turbine 5,71 4,31 1,40 5,83 4,27 1,56 6,31 4,24 2,07
natural gas combined cycle without CO2 capture 6,20 4,81 1,39 6,04 4,58 1,46 6,43 4,54 1,89
natural gas combined cycle with CO2 capture 6,20 4,81 1,39 6,90 5,98 0,92 7,03 5,91 1,12
wind, on-shore 6,21 6,11 0,10 6,09 6,02 0,07 6,03 5,96 0,07
wind, off-shore 6,46 6,36 0,10 6,21 6,14 0,07 5,88 5,81 0,07
hard coal condensing power plant 6,47 3,33 3,14 6,52 3,23 3,29 7,30 3,16 4,14
hard coal IGCC without CO2 capture 6,61 3,91 2,70 6,03 3,54 2,49 6,77 3,50 3,27
hard coal IGCC with CO2 capture 6,61 3,91 2,70 5,66 4,20 1,46 5,95 4,16 1,79
hydropower, run of river >100MW 6,85 6,81 0,04 6,85 6,80 0,05 6,86 6,80 0,06
hydropower, run of river 10MW 7,90 7,83 0,07 7,91 7,83 0,08 7,92 7,83 0,09
hydropower, run of river <100MW 7,98 7,93 0,05 7,99 7,93 0,06 8,00 7,93 0,07
natural gas, gas turbine 8,66 6,58 2,08 8,89 6,60 2,29 9,48 6,53 2,95
heavy oil condensing power plant 8,96 6,57 2,39 10,19 7,19 3,00 11,10 7,46 3,64
hydropower, pump storage 11,10 11,04 0,06 11,11 11,04 0,07 11,13 11,04 0,09
hydropower, dam (reservoir) 11,12 11,04 0,08 11,13 11,04 0,09 11,15 11,04 0,11
light oil gas turbine 12,34 9,87 2,47 13,01 10,08 2,93 14,03 10,34 3,69
solar thermal, parabolic trough 12,88 12,76 0,12 10,41 10,30 0,11 9,61 9,50 0,11
MCFC (biogas) 35,21 31,88 3,33 17,26 13,23 4,03 10,75 6,36 4,39
MCFC (natural gas) 35,55 33,55 2,00 15,77 13,34 2,43 9,91 7,26 2,65
solar PV, open space 36,80 35,91 0,89 21,65 20,83 0,82 17,51 16,58 0,93
solar PV, roof 45,63 44,76 0,87 25,94 25,14 0,80 24,39 23,48 0,91
SOFC (natural gas) 47,73 46,80 0,93 12,54 11,55 0,99 8,25 7,02 1,23
Figure 4: Summary of CASES results. (Source: CASES (2009))















Proposition 2 An optimal feed-in tari⁄ internalising an energy security risk is
higher (resp. lower) than the electricity price if the production of renewable electric-
ity is initially too low (resp. too high) compared to the optimal level.
It is therefore technically possible to internalise an energy security externality
by using a feed-in tari⁄ or tradable green certi￿cates if we know what the optimal
energy-mix is. The feed-in tari⁄will be higher or lower than the price faced by fossil-
fuel based power producers, depending on whether the regulator considers that there
is too much or too little renewable electricity produced. However, this requires ￿rst
to clearly understand what the energy security risk covers and to be able to measure
it.
Diversity can be discussed in terms of balance, variety and disparity of the en-
ergy system (Stirling 2009). Variety is the number of di⁄erent energy sources and
technologies that are used in the energy system. Balance is a function of the dis-
tribution between these sources and technologies. Disparity refers to the degree to
which these sources and technologies are related. Therefore, when discussing diver-
sity, the presence of various energy sources is not su¢ cient. The relative share of
each source also matters. Disparity is also relevant because some sources present
similar characteristics and face similar challenges; for example the prices of oil and
gas are highly related. It results from this analysis that no simple criterion can be
used to measure the energy security risk reduction due to the presence of renewables.
Most of the literature seems to follow an approach consisting of building indices
measuring the degree of diversity in energy sources. These indices try to include
as many dimensions as possible but often fail to induce consistent choices across
dimensions (Kruyt et al. 2009). It is not clear how these results can be used to
determine the optimal level of support to renewable power production. In fact, the
optimal level of policy intervention derived above assumes implicitly that both the
optimal level of diversi￿cation as well as the damage induced by energy insecurity
is known. The above-mentioned indices, on the other hand, are potentially able to
rank Member States in terms of the exposure to energy security risk but do not
permit to measure the externality associated with this energy insecurity. At this
stage, the only policy recommendation that could be derived is that higher levels of
support schemes could be justi￿ed for Member States with a high energy security
index.
An alternative approach would be to measure the direct costs associated with
energy insecurity (De Joode et al. 2004). A cost-bene￿t analysis of various mea-
sures to improve the security of energy supply in the Netherlands is provided. On
16electricity markets, the authors consider that the key risks refer to the ability of the
power sector to meet demand at all times, and the threat of execution of market
power by producers. The creation of capacity markets, reserve contracts and ca-
pacity payments could give power producers additional incentives to invest in peak
capacity. The implementation of these measures incurs relatively high costs. Hence,
the policy options are not e¢ cient in preventing price spikes, as the welfare costs of
price spikes are lower than the costs of the policy options (unless price spikes occur
with an implausibly high frequency).
A ￿nal approach could consist of measuring the di⁄erence between the produc-
tion costs of a natural gas combined cycle power plant and of renewable power
technologies, adjusted for environmental externalities. This approach would o⁄er
an estimate of the externality needed to justify the policy. A natural gas combined
cycle power plant is considered as the reference technology, as it is the likely choice
for new investments in conventional power production in the EU. Using results of
the CASES project (see Figure 4), one can see that the energy security risk would
have to represent a cost of e0.01 cent/kWh to justify producing electricity with on-
shore wind energy instead of a natural gas combined cycle. For all other renewable
technologies, a higher energy security cost would be necessary to justify the change
in technologies. Note also that the di⁄erence between natural gas combined cycle
without CO2 capture and on-shore wind will increase slightly by 2020-2030.
Renewable energy sources have so far only been presented as reducing energy se-
curity risk. However, the opposite could be true in some cases. First, energy security
issues are often the results of imperfectly competitive markets. In this respect, com-
petition between renewable energy technology suppliers needs to be fostered in order
to avoid market power on the supplier side and to limit unjusti￿ed price ￿ uctuations.
For instance, according to the International Energy Agency, learning e⁄ects have in-
duced decreasing wind turbine costs by a factor of four since the 1980s. However,
since 2004, they have increased by 20-80%, due to tight supply of turbines and com-
ponents and high commodity prices (International Energy Agency 2008). Second,
intermittency is the greatest obstacle to the seamless integration of wind and solar
generated power into electricity grids. Diversi￿cation between both di⁄erent renew-
able energy sources and other sources and the promotion of grid interconnections
will reduce the problem with intermittency as well as the risk of extreme weather
events disabling electricity infrastructures.
Policy conclusion 2 Based on currently available evidence, the bene￿ts of increased
energy security seem to be quite modest. Besides, renewable sources can also, in cer-
tain cases, contribute to an increase in the energy security risk. This implies that
apart from on-shore wind, it is di¢ cult to justify costly support measures with energy
security bene￿ts.
173.4 Knowledge spillovers and learning-by doing
As mentioned in Section 2, production cost in the renewable energy sector is expected
to decrease over time. Cumulative learning is an important determinant of future
production costs. In the renewables sector, total learning depends on individual
output levels, but also on the output of all other ￿rms in the sector. The spillover
e⁄ect is not considered by individual ￿rms when choosing their optimal level of
investment, which creates an externality and the need for public intervention. With
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In this context, a feed-in tari⁄is only justi￿ed in period 1. However, this will have
consequences in period 2, because production costs and thus optimal production
levels will change for renewable-based electricity producers. Annex 8.1.2 provides
the necessary steps that allow us to conclude that the optimal feed-in tari⁄ is:
(12) ￿
￿




The optimal feed-in tari⁄ has to be set equal to the sum of the market price
for electricity and the discounted marginal gains from period-one learning spillovers
in period two. Note that without learning spillovers, there is no justi￿cation for
distorting the electricity market. The optimal share of renewables is also implic-
itly de￿ned by this condition as it gives the optimal output level for ￿rms in the
renewables sector.
This equation also reveals that if renewable technologies di⁄er with respect to
marginal gains from learning in period two and/or the spillover rate, or the number
of adopting ￿rms, a di⁄erentiation of feed-in tari⁄s can be justi￿ed on e¢ ciency
grounds. However, no distinction needs to be made in the choice of the feed-in tari⁄
to take account of initial di⁄erences in production costs. Therefore, it is not so much
the initial situation but rather the learning rate that justi￿es di⁄erences in feed-in
tari⁄s between renewable technologies.
Proposition 3 An optimal feed-in tari⁄ considering learning-by doing would always
be higher than the electricity price. If renewable technologies di⁄er with respect to (1)
marginal gains from learning in period two, (2) the spillover rate, or (3) the number
of adopting ￿rms, a di⁄erentiation of feed-in tari⁄s can be justi￿ed on e¢ ciency
grounds.
18The risk with uniform support schemes is that more mature, close to market,
renewable energy technologies, for instance wind, will dominate the market. Even
if there is room for a certain degree of specialisation, too much specialisation could
result in a new form of energy dependence on a limited set of technologies. Fur-
thermore, within the wind power sector, there is a need to carefully design the time
development of the tari⁄ levels. Increases in the feed-in tari⁄ for wind power pro-
mote di⁄usion of wind capacity, which in turn encourages learning and generates
cost reductions. However, there exists also a direct negative e⁄ect of feed-in tari⁄
increases on learning. They induce wind power producers to select high-cost sites,
for example locations with expensive grid connections and/or poor wind conditions
and discourage the competitive pressure from other energy sources, and ￿as a result
￿innovation activities become less attractive (S￿derholm & Klaassen 2007).
As explained above, one of the main rationale for technology-speci￿c support
schemes is based on variations in learning rates. However, there is no easy way to
measure learning rates. Di⁄erences in the return on private and public investments
in R&D could be used as a proxy for the spillover rate, but no data exist yet for
this sector. Another approach would consist of making a distinction between the
social and private progress ratios, which measure the learning rate of a technology by
considering the cost decline for every doubling of capacity. However, current studies
seem to concentrate on determining the progress ratio at the sector level, without
making a distinction between private and social learning rates. The estimation of
these ratios usually varies between 0.75 and 0.95, depending on the studies and
the technologies considered (Van Benthem et al. 2008, Papineau 2006). One policy
conclusion is that it is extremely di¢ cult to measure the spillover rate, even though
it is a key element for the determination of optimal support schemes and their levels.
The proxy used in the literature is the progress ratio, and di⁄erences in progress
ratios are used to justify technology speci￿c support schemes.
One advantage of technology-speci￿c feed-in tari⁄s is that they allow a simul-
taneous development of various technologies. On the contrary, green certi￿cates
normally cover all eligible technologies without distinguishing between them, which
favours the most advanced technologies while providing too small incentives for less
advanced ones. Unfortunately, a potential di⁄erentiation of green certi￿cates by
technology would reduce the scope of exchanges and negatively in￿ uence the liq-
uidity of these markets. Thus, tradable green certi￿cates need to be complemented
with other instruments in order to promote the development of a diversi￿ed mix of
renewable energy technologies.
When all learning e⁄ects are assimilated, it is not necessary anymore to support
renewables technologies. Thus, support schemes need to be phased out when learn-
ing spillovers disappear. This implies that if the evaluation of the spillover rate is
incorrect and support measures are badly adjusted, rents risk emerging for renew-
able producers as they could bene￿t from too high support levels for too long. At
19this stage, the phasing out of support schemes depends on the level of development
for each renewable technology.
Policy conclusion 3 Learning rates and spillovers justify the presence of support
schemes, but measuring spillover rates adequately is a major challenge. Optimal
support levels vary across technologies and Member States, and should be reduced
regularly to provide incentives for technology development.
3.5 Combining learning-by doing and pollution
This scenario assumes that the regulator faces two externalities: pollution and learn-
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A ￿rst-best outcome is achievable through the combination of two instruments.
For instance, the regulator can use an environmental tax and a feed-in tari⁄ to











￿(n ￿ 1) (15)
where ￿ is the pollution tax rate per unit of emissions. The optimal pollution tax
is the Pigovian one, equal to the marginal social damage of emissions. Renewable
support schemes can be entirely dedicated to addressing the spillover externality.
Considering now that the regulator has to use the renewable support scheme to



































20A feed-in tari⁄addressing both the environmental and the learning externalities
would be set higher than the one obtained in the context of an optimal policy mix.
This is because the regulator must increase the incentives to produce renewable-
based electricity so as to indirectly a⁄ect the production of fossil-fuel based elec-
tricity. First-best welfare is not achievable as the same instrument has to be used
to modify two variables, that is, renewable-based and fossil-fuel based electricity
production.
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If the regulator can use two instruments, then an optimal policy-mix would be
the combination of a tax ￿ on each unit of fossil-fuel based electricity production
















The regulator may have to address both the knowledge spillovers and the energy
security externality through the choice of a single renewable energy policy. The ￿rst-
best solution is not achievable as the same instrument has to be used to in￿ uence in
two di⁄erent ways two distinct maximisation production decisions. In other words,
the optimal feed-in tari⁄should be di⁄erent for fossil-fuel based producers, to address
e¢ ciently energy security issues, than for renewable-based electricity producers, to
address energy security and learning spillovers. Thus, the optimal policy will be the
result of a trade-o⁄ between the two externalities. The second-best optimal feed-in
tari⁄ is:
(21) ￿Poll+ES = P1 ￿ ￿
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An optimal feed-in tari⁄ regulating both learning e⁄ects and an energy security
externality will be higher (resp. lower) than the feed-in tari⁄ only focusing on
21learning spillovers if the initial level of renewables is less (resp. more) than the
optimal level.
3.7 Combining all three externalities
Finally, let us consider the general case where the regulator needs to address all
three externalities simultaneously. Welfare in this context is given by Equation
(1). The social optimum in period 1 is given by Equations (2) and (3). Assuming
that the regulator can use as many instruments as she wants, one can show that
only two instruments are necessary to perfectly internalise these externalities. The
main intuition for this result is that these three externalities are associated with
only two production decisions. Therefore, only two instruments are necessary to
in￿ uence the two production decisions. Using a tax rate # on each unit of fossil-fuel
based electricity produced and a feed-in tari⁄, the regulator can address all three


















However, in the context of this study, the relevant case is when only the renewable
support scheme is used to address all three externalities simultaneously. As one
instrument cannot adequately in￿ uence two separate production decisions, ￿rst-best
outcomes are not achievable anymore. The second-best tari⁄ is then the result of a
trade-o⁄ between the di⁄erent externalities.
(24) ￿ = P1 ￿ ￿
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As stated in introduction, the renewable energy policy has three main objectives
(i) reducing environmental pollution, (ii) diversifying the energy mix and thereby
improving energy security, while at the same time (iii) contributing to the competi-
tiveness and growth of the EU economy through technological development and the
development of a new industry. If this is the case, then optimal support schemes
should be determined based on the elements emphasized in Equation (24). We
have seen in this section that accurate measurement of these externalities is not
straightforward. The following sections re￿ne this analysis and present an economic
assessment of current policies.
Annex 8.2 provides a numerical illustration of the main results of the model.
Some sensitivity analysis is provided so as to discuss the impact of the main pa-
rameters of the model on optimal support schemes. It is also a way to illustrate
22Figure 5: Cost-e⁄ectiveness and cost for consumers: feed-in tari⁄s vs. tradable
quotas with lower-than-expected marginal costs of producing renewable electricity
(Source: Finon, 2007)
how only using renewable policies to regulate three distinct externalities reduces the
economy￿ s overall welfare.
4 Considerations on the design of support schemes
4.1 Introducing uncertainty
The discussion on the level of support schemes has so far not considered any un-
certainties in cost development. One of the consequences is that in a situation with
perfect information both instruments have similar e⁄ects. However, if this condition
is relaxed, then the relative impact of feed-in tari⁄s and green certi￿cates will di⁄er
(Finon 2007).
Consider the situation in Figure 5 where, contrary to expectations, the marginal
cost curve turns out to be MC￿instead of MC. In case feed-in tari⁄s are the policy
instruments, renewable electricity production will be Q￿ , the cost for consumers is
OQ￿ YP and producers￿surplus is WYP. In case a tradable green certi￿cate system
is the instrument, output reaches the expected level Q, the price of renewable elec-
tricity is P￿ , cost for consumers is OQZP￿ , and producers￿surplus is WZP￿ . All in all,
when the marginal cost of renewable electricity turns out to be lower than expected
23by policy makers, feed-in tari⁄s deliver a higher output at the pre-determined price
P whereas a tradable green certi￿cate system delivers the targeted output at a lower
price. Thus, in case regulators overestimate the cost of producing renewable tech-
nologies, a tradable system is more cost-e⁄ective than a feed-in tari⁄as it limits the
risk of an excessively high output and burden on consumers. Tradable green certi￿-
cates will, in this case, limit the burden on consumers by automatically adjusting
the price of certi￿cates. This also underlines that in the presence of learning rates,
feed-in tari⁄s need to be frequently reviewed so as to adjust to the latest available
information.
From the ￿rm￿ s point of view, another distinction needs to be made between
the two instruments. Under imperfect information, there is uncertainty on the
value of the endogenous variable, that is, quantity with feed-in tari⁄s and price
with certi￿cates. The di⁄erence is that in the case of a feed-in tari⁄ the quantity
produced only depends on the renewable electricity producer￿ s decision. Given its
cost structure, a producer determines its optimal level of production. Conversely,
with green certi￿cates, the price at which certi￿cates are sold is not only in￿ uenced
by the ￿rm￿ s cost structure but also by its competitors￿ . Hence, ￿rms that are
risk-averse are less willing to invest as their expected return on investment not only
depends on their cost structure but also on competitors￿ .
Hence, one element of best practice for national support schemes is to provide
stability, such as through the setting of targets or other objectives and the creation
of long-term support schemes. By guaranteeing the price and providing a secure
demand, feed-in tari⁄s reduce both the price and market risks, and create certainty
for the investor regarding the rate of return. This seems to be one of the main
explanations for the popularity of feed-in tari⁄s, and their success in generating
investment. Conversely, uncertainty about the current and future price of tradable
green certi￿cates can increase the ￿nancial risks faced by developers and can have
a negative impact on their willingness to invest in renewable energy technologies.
Furthermore, producers have to sell green electricity as two products, electricity and
green certi￿cates, and the risk on the green certi￿cates market is added to the risk on
the wholesale electricity market. Thus, so far, certi￿cates have generally generated
fewer investments than feed-in tari⁄s and higher costs for consumers. The risks
associated with a feed-in premium will be between those of the other two systems.
The premium provides a secure additional return for producers, while exposing them
to the electricity price risk.
Policy conclusion 4 By e⁄ectively guaranteeing the price and providing a secure
demand, feed-in tari⁄s create certainty for the investor regarding the rate of return.
However, they also risk inducing a high burden on consumers when production cost
estimates are incorrect. Hence, they should be time-limited to keep rents and the
overall costs for consumers down, and frequently reviewed to adjust the system to
24the latest available information. This is also valid for a feed-in premium. Certi￿cates
should in theory limit the costs to consumers as the level of support is determined on
the market. However, this feature also induces a market risk for producers, which
has proved not to be conducive to investments in new capacity.
4.2 Harmonisation of support schemes and trade
The issue of a Community framework for support schemes was already raised in
the Directive 2001/77/EC on promotion of renewable energy sources in the internal
electricity market. The directive called for a report on support schemes by 2005,
which could be accompanied with a proposal on a Community framework (European
Commission 2005). Such an EU-wide scheme would be cost-e¢ cient and reduce costs
as it would allocate renewable electricity production where it is most favourable, that
is, have lowest costs. A related issue is its better compatibility with the internal
electricity market, as the support scheme needs to be conducive to trade in electricity
on the internal market. The subsequent discussion has focused on a common green
certi￿cate system, as this would ful￿l these criteria.
The main advantage of a common certi￿cate system is its potential to foster a
cost-e⁄ective development of renewable electricity production across the EU. This
would provide a least-cost production of the targeted amount of renewable electric-
ity, a common price of green certi￿cates, and the equalisation of marginal costs of
producing renewable electricity across the EU. However, two conditions need to be
ful￿lled for this to be feasible: (i) a well-integrated European electricity market with
a common electricity price, and (ii) a harmonised institutional and regulatory frame-
work for the green certi￿cate market. A competitive electricity market is required
in order to ensure an optimal allocation of renewable electricity production due to
the fact that it is the sum of the certi￿cate and electricity prices that determines
the allocation of renewable electricity production. Hence, imperfect integration of
the electricity market may result in di⁄erent marginal costs for renewable electricity
production across the EU and a less than optimal allocation of production, despite
a common European price for certi￿cates.
Harmonisation based on a common certi￿cation system has also been criticised
by some authors on several grounds. First, there is a risk that harmonisation will not
favour the development of a broad range of technologies, as it will tend to support
the most mature technologies, which might inhibit the development of a broad range
of renewable energy technologies and the related industries in Europe. Second, one
argument has been that harmonisation will not take account of local environmental
and regional development objectives. For instance, political objectives such as re-
ducing local air pollution or creating local job opportunities in the renewable sector
risk not being realised with a harmonised system. These e⁄ects would translate into
di⁄erent external costs and bene￿ts associated with the renewable energy produc-
25tion. Third, concerns have been expressed regarding the functioning of both the
electricity market (see above) as well as the certi￿cate market. Finally, harmoni-
sation risks creating large rents as the level of support will be determined by the
marginal cost of the last technology supported (Del Rio 2005, Jacobsson et al. 2009).
Directive 2009/28/EC (European Commission 2009a)8 sets targets at national
level for the overall share of renewable energy in the Member States￿ fuel mix.
Targets are based on a ￿ at rate increase in the share of renewables weighted by GDP
and modulated to take account of earlier development of these resources. Thus,
they are not solely based on the national renewable resource potential. Trade in
renewable energy would therefore be very useful at the Member State level. This
would mitigate di⁄erences in the resource potential and other factors and thereby
di⁄erences in costs between countries. As a result, trade would reduce the overall
cost of the policy.
The Renewable Energy Directive introduces the possibility to trade through
￿ exibility measures under the control of Member States. The aim is to facilitate
cross-border exchange without a⁄ecting national support schemes. Hence, the Di-
rective includes provisions for ￿statistical transfers￿between Member States in or-
der to allow for a more cost-e⁄ective distribution of renewable energy production.
These measures can also take the form of joint projects between Member States and
joint support schemes. The Renewable Directive thereby allows for voluntary and
bilateral harmonisation of marginal generation costs of renewable energy sources be-
tween Member States, while safeguarding national control over the various systems.
In particular, ￿ exible mechanisms should allow Member States to reap bene￿ts from
favourable conditions in some countries that are not yet fully exploited. However, it
remains to be seen to which extent this possibility will be utilised by Member States.
No clear indication has been given yet on the implementation of these measures.
Policy conclusion 5 Harmonisation of support schemes would equalise marginal
production costs and thereby minimise the cost of the policy as production would
be allocated e¢ ciently across the EU. However, harmonisation based on a common
certi￿cate system would run the risk of mainly supporting mature technologies. An-
other concern is that local environmental and regional development bene￿ts will not
8The Commission report from 2005 stayed short of proposing a common framework as it
advocated co-operation between countries and optimisation of the impact on national schemes
(European Commission 2005). At that time, it was seen as too early to harmonise the systems
due to the limited experience with the various systems. The follow-up report in 2008 also found
it to be inappropriate to harmonise the support schemes, mainly due to the fact that it remained
unclear which of the system was more e¢ cient (European Commission 2008d). The new Renewable
Directive does not explicitly aim at harmonisation of support schemes. However, the Commission
is to present an analysis and action plan on, inter alia, better co-ordination of Community and
national funding and other forms of support. (Article 23(7).)
26accrue to the country granting the support. Finally, an optimal allocation of renew-
able power production is dependent on well-functioning and competitive electricity
and certi￿cate markets.
4.3 Interactions with the internal market
One issue that requires attention is to which extent the support system is compati-
ble with and supports a competitive and well-integrated internal electricity market.
It is estimated that renewable energy sources will account for around 31% of elec-
tricity production in 2020. As mentioned earlier, at present the share amounts to
17%, while the support schemes can be assumed to cover around 7% (excluding
hydropower). Considerable growth is expected to take place in the new renewable
technologies during the next 20 years, while the EU will continue to pursue its e⁄orts
to create a competitive well-functioning internal electricity market. It is therefore vi-
tal that the support schemes applied are conducive to trade and support the creation
of the internal market, in particular as the share of renewable electricity grows.
A recent contribution discusses the potential e¢ ciency gains in the longer term
of exposing renewable power producers, and in particular wind producers, to more
market signals (Hiroux & Saguan 2009). This implies that wind producers should
participate in the day-ahead/intraday market, the balancing market and be ex-
posed to congestion pricing. Hence, by exposing wind producers to market signals,
improvements could be achieved concerning (i) a better selection of wind sites in
relation to temporal generation patterns (for example peak loads), (ii) an optimal
selection of sites in relation to congestion costs and losses, (iii) maintenance plan-
ning, (iv) technology combinations and portfolios, (v) intermittency issues, through
innovation, and (vi) forecasting and system balancing e¢ ciency.
Feed-in tari⁄s are problematic in these respects as they risk distorting the whole-
sale market. Feed-in tari⁄s include a (feed-in) obligation on the system operator
and/or distributor to buy the renewable electricity at a ￿xed price. This implies
that renewable power produced under the feed-in tari⁄ regime remains outside the
trade on the wholesale service exchange, that is, the day-ahead and intraday mar-
kets. If there is no obligation for balancing9, the producers are not taking part on
the balancing market either10. Hence, in practice, the system reduces liquidity on
9Balancing responsible parties is de￿ned as having an obligation to submit day ahead generation
schedules (modi￿able up to closing time before delivery) and to bear ￿nancial responsibility for
any deviation from this schedule (Klessmann et al. 1987) .
10Provisions regarding balancing di⁄er across countries. In Germany balancing is done at the
level of the transmission system operator. Hence, producers are not exposed to market signals.
Wind producers applying the feed-in tari⁄ in Spain, on the other hand, are exposed to imbalance
prices, but are provided with wider tolerance margins than other electricity producers. The pro-
ducers applying the premium are furthermore fully responsible for balancing like any other market
participant (Klessmann et al. 1987).
27the wholesale exchange, which has negative implications for the overall functioning
of the market.
Both a feed-in premium and a certi￿cate system are, on the other hand, more
compatible with well-functioning electricity wholesale markets. A premium system,
which provides a ￿xed support on top of the underlying electricity price, has the
advantage of allowing all electricity to be traded and priced on the wholesale market.
By exposing producers to the electricity market price, feed-in premiums should
provide the necessary incentives to achieve the improvements mentioned above, while
limiting the risk exposure imposed by a certi￿cate system.
However, neither feed-in tari⁄s nor premiums facilitate trade in the "green" prop-
erty of the electricity as does a certi￿cate. The fact that the support is provided
at the point of the delivery to the grid, that is, at the "feed-in", implies that these
schemes in fact ￿nearly by de￿nition ￿are limited to domestic producers. Hence,
the support is granted to the producers in the appropriate jurisdiction. In prac-
tice, this depends on the detailed construction of the system. Ireland is the only
EU country that currently applies feed-in tari⁄s and allows other EU-producers to
be eligible for the tari⁄ under certain conditions11. In this case the guaranteed
feed-in tari⁄ is granted to the supplier, who will buy the electricity from di⁄erent
producers. However, it is assumed that these bilateral trades, possibly with foreign
producers, will take place outside the market place. In the German case, on the
other hand, it appears di¢ cult to extend the system to foreign suppliers as it is the
grid operator that provides the guaranteed tari⁄, and the costs are subsequently
transferred to the transmission operator and later on to the suppliers/consumers.
Thus, in practice, all but one feed-in system apply only to domestic producers. This
distorts competition, in particular in a situation where electricity markets are being
increasingly integrated. The Member States that apply certi￿cates normally also
limit their eligibility to domestic producers. The exception in this case is Italy,
which acknowledges certi￿cates of origin from other Member States as well as on
the basis of bilateral agreements with Albania and Switzerland. It is easy to fa-
cilitate international trade in certi￿cates by allowing them to be credited against
the quota obligation. However, in order to gain the full advantages of trade and
avoid distortions, harmonisation of eligible technologies and other rules governing
certi￿cates might prove necessary.
Policy conclusion 6 In order to limit internal market distortions, feed-in premi-
ums should be preferred over feed-in tari⁄s. However, when possible, tradable green
11A certi￿cate of origin or a supplementary document needs to prove that the electricity was
generated from renewable energy sources and that it does not contribute to the achievement of the
Member State￿ s energy goals for a period of 15 years. Furthermore, the construction of the plant
generating renewable energy needs to be authorised according to the provisions of the respective
Member State.
28certi￿cates should be used, as they limit internal market distortions and facilitate
trade in the green property of electricity.
4.4 Combination or sequencing of instruments?
From the analysis presented above, it does not seem to exist one optimal instru-
ment that could be used for any kind of renewable energy technology and in any
circumstances. On the one hand, by e⁄ectively guaranteeing the price and providing
a secure demand, feed-in tari⁄s create certainty for the investor regarding the rate
of return. On the other hand, feed-in tari⁄s risk distorting the wholesale market,
whereas a premium system has the advantage of allowing all electricity to be traded
and priced on the wholesale market.
Certi￿cates can be regarded as an even more suitable instrument once the tech-
nology is close to being competitive. At that stage, a certi￿cate system would expose
producers to market forces and provide a more competitive environment, while still
providing support. The system is more compatible with the Internal Market which is
important when volumes grow, and trade could potentially be allowed across the EU.
Another advantage is the fact that the support will be automatically phased out once
the technology manages to compete. A potential problem is that the market might
be rather limited if this is based on one or a few technologies; application at the EU
level might address this issue. It has also been shown that broad-based policies, such
as tradable energy certi￿cates, are more likely to induce innovation in technologies
that are close to being competitive with fossil fuels (Johnstone et al. 2009). More
targeted subsidies, such as feed-in premiums, are on the other hand more suitable
to induce innovation in more costly energy technologies.
Overall, an option to consider would then be to combine feed-in premiums and
tradable certi￿cates. Tradable green certi￿cates would be used as a general support
scheme for all renewable electricity. The certi￿cate price would provide support in
addition to the electricity price. Meanwhile, speci￿c technologies, for instance pho-
tovoltaic energy, would bene￿t from a guaranteed feed-in premium in addition to
the electricity and green certi￿cate equilibrium prices. Such a combination of instru-
ments should in theory address speci￿c learning e⁄ects for less mature renewable
technologies, while at the same time providing e¢ cient support for more mature
technologies.
Figure 6 considers the potential impact of such a policy on the market for green
certi￿cates. First, an exogenous number Q￿ of green certi￿cates is ￿xed by the
regulator. It is the only support scheme. The supply curve S is the sum of individual
supply curves from renewable-based electricity producers. Let us consider that there
are two types of producers, wind-based and photovoltaic-based electricity producers,
and that wind-based electricity is cheaper than photovoltaic-based electricity. From
the analysis above, we know that green certi￿cates tend to favour the cheapest
29Figure 6: E⁄ect of a combination of instruments on the market for green certi￿cates
technology, and it is likely that most of the green electricity produced in the baseline
scenario comes from wind-mills.
Second, the regulator decides to introduce feed-in premiums for photovoltaic-
based power producers. This subsidy induces a shift to the right in the individual
supply curves of photovoltaic-based power producers, which translates into a new
overall supply curve S0. The share of renewable production is exogenously given by
the quota obligation determined by the regulatory agency. Thus, increasing pro-
duction of photovoltaic-based electricity would come at the expense of wind-based
electricity generation, creating crowding-out e⁄ects between renewable technologies.
In addition, this drives downward the equilibrium price of green certi￿cates, which
has a non-ambiguous negative e⁄ect on wind-based power producers￿pro￿ts. The
impact on photovoltaic-based power producers￿pro￿ts depends on the price-supply
elasticity for green certi￿cates. When production costs are quadratic the supply
is inelastic enough to increase photovoltaic-based power producers￿pro￿ts12. This
does not have to be the case in a more general context. Furthermore, the indirect
impact on the price for electricity would also have to be taken into account.
Of course, the regulator could decide to increase the quota for green electricity.
This would translate into a shift to the right in the demand for green electricity,
in blue on Figure 6, and an increase in the price for green certi￿cates from P 0 to
12For instance when c(xs) = sx2
s and c(xw) = wx2
w, where xs is the production of photovoltaic-
based electricity and xw the production of wind-based electricity, with s > w, the presence of a
feed-in premium would result in a less than proportional change in P.
30P 00. This would reduce crowding-out e⁄ects and could potentially increase pro￿ts
for both types of renewable-based power producers. However, a simpler signal would
be sent to renewable-based power producers by using a sequencing of instruments
instead of a combination of instruments.
When implementing a sequencing of instruments, it would be decided ex ante
which technologies bene￿t from feed-in premiums, and which technologies use trad-
able green certi￿cates. The decision would be based on the maturity of the technol-
ogy and the need for stable support to promote investments and economies of scale.
The choice of instruments should be reviewed on a regular basis. This would limit
the risk of crowding-out e⁄ects without jeopardising the overall cost-e⁄ectiveness of
the system, since the other characteristics of the combination of instruments would
be maintained. The only risk is that the market for green certi￿cates would be too
thin but this could potentially be addressed by facilitating international trade in
certi￿cates.
Policy conclusion 7 Support schemes should ￿t the level of development of the
technology. The solution may be to sequence instruments according to the maturity
of the technology. Feed-in premiums can be used for technologies at the early stage of
market deployment. Once the volumes start to have an impact on the internal market
and the technology approaches competitiveness, tradable green certi￿cates would be
a more suitable support instrument.
5 Economic assessment of current policies
5.1 Assessment of current features of support schemes
Based on the Renewable Energy Progress Report (European Commission 2009b),
the following Box summarises the choices made on the design of support schemes
by Member States.
31￿ 18 countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain) use di⁄er-
entiated feed-in tari⁄s or premiums.
￿In most cases, feed-in tari⁄s are time-limited, except for Spain
(lower ￿xed rate after 15-25 years) and Latvia (solar energy). The
time limitation can take di⁄erent forms, for instance in Hungary
the period is determined by the Energy O¢ ce.
￿Austria, Spain and Slovenia apply reduced rates after a speci￿ed
number of years.
￿ Cyprus and Estonia (for 12 years) use uniform feed-in tari⁄s.
￿ Premiums are used in Denmark (for 10 years) and in the Netherlands.
Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Spain o⁄er the choice between
feed-in tari⁄s and premiums.
￿ Green certi￿cates are used in Belgium, Italy, Poland, Romania, Sweden
and the UK.
￿Programs are time-limited except for Poland.
￿Belgium sets minimum prices (which vary across regions), Poland
imposes a price (average market price of the previous year) and
in Romania prices must fall between 24-42 euro up to 2012. Only
Sweden and the UK do not guarantee prices.
￿Lithuania is committed to using green certi￿cates beyond 2020.
￿ Denmark (o⁄shore wind farms), France (wind, biomass and biogas),
Latvia (wind over 0.25 MW) and Portugal (wind and biomass) also use
tenders.
￿ Malta o⁄ers grants.
The vast majority of Member States (21 out of 27) use feed-in tari⁄s or premiums
to promote renewable energy sources. 18 countries use di⁄erentiated feed-in tari⁄s,
which facilitates the development of a portfolio of various renewable power technolo-
gies. In most countries, the di⁄erentiation according to technology is signi￿cant, for
example the support to photovoltaic is often 5 to 10 times the level provided for
small hydro. This re￿ ects varying production costs across technologies as well as
the expected externalities that support schemes help to internalise (see Figure 3).
A few countries, for example Estonia and Cyprus, apply, however, a common
feed-in tari⁄ across technologies. In such a system, technologies will be in competi-
32tion with each other for the support, which will favour the lowest cost, that is, the
most competitive technologies. A non-di⁄erentiated feed-in tari⁄ will, like a certi￿-
cate system, promote cost-e¢ ciency at the expense of technology di⁄erentiation.
Feed-in tari⁄s are in most cases time-limited, which should facilitate the phasing-
out of the support and keep the costs down for consumers. This also limits windfall
rents to producers once the investment is recovered. In other cases, for example
in Spain, the overall cost of the system is limited through a maximum support by
installed capacity according to technology and year. However, the fact that the
support is provided for the entire time of the operation of installations in Spain
risks providing producers with the above mentioned windfall rents.
Most countries update their support levels rather regularly in order to take ac-
count of developments in electricity and other markets. For example both Bulgaria
and Hungary revise their tari⁄s annually for all installations with references to in-
￿ ation and electricity price developments. Latvia adjusts the tari⁄s to take account
of exchange rate and gas price developments. However, it is less clear how regularly
and systematically support levels are updated to re￿ ect changes in production costs
as well as to incentivise progress in technology development. The German system
can be seen as best practice in this respect. It explicitly addresses this issue by re-
ducing feed-in tari⁄s gradually by a prescribed percentage with the aim to provide
incentives for future technology development.
Only Denmark and the Netherlands o⁄er premiums as their only price instru-
ment, which makes their systems more compatible with liberalised electricity mar-
kets. A premium is provided in addition to the market price of electricity. In
Denmark a statutory maximum is set for the sum of the market price and the pre-
mium. The maximum puts a cap on the overall return for producers and thereby
limits overall costs for consumers. The statutory maximum depends on the plant￿ s
date of connection, the energy source, and the technology. The premium granted
in the Netherlands is determined yearly. In contrast with the Danish case, this is
directly ￿nanced from the public budget, which also puts an overall cap on the cost
of the system. If demand for premiums exceeds the allocated budget, the subsidy
will be granted according to the order of the submission of applications. This system
was only implemented in 2008, so the experience so far is limited. It appears that
this approach could create a problem of continuity and certainty for investors, if the
demand for the support is greater than the allocated funds.
Spain, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia have introduced the possibility
to choose between feed-in tari⁄s and premiums. The ￿ exibility and coverage of the
systems di⁄er. In the Czech Republic, the choice can be reversed at the earliest after
a year. In Spain, large installations above 50MW are only entitled to the premium,
with the exception of photovoltaic systems, which are covered exclusively by the
￿xed feed-in tari⁄. Other Spanish producers can choose yearly whether to apply the
premium or the tari⁄, and whether these should be ￿xed or variable.
33To allow producers to choose between tari⁄s and premiums provides them with
the possibility to take advantage of years with higher electricity prices, while limiting
the exposure to falling or low prices. These hybrid systems allow producers to take
on greater price risk, using the guaranteed feed-in tari⁄s as a price ￿ oor. Combining
feed-in tari⁄s and premiums can be regarded as a transition phase, as the introduc-
tion of a premium makes the system more market-oriented and exposes producers
to more risk. However, to make the system compatible with a well-functioning
electricity market, the premium should be the preferred instrument.
Six countries are currently using green certi￿cates. In this case, both the cer-
ti￿cate and the electricity can be traded on the market. It can be noted that both
the UK and Sweden, which liberalised their electricity markets relatively early, have
opted for certi￿cate systems. On these markets, the penalty fee paid by electricity
producers in case of non respect of the quota plays de facto the role of a price ceiling.
The main aim of the fee is to constitute a sanction for the electricity retailers who
have failed to ful￿l the quota. In Sweden the fee is set at 150% of the average cer-
ti￿cate price in the obligation period (normally the corresponding year). However,
the degree of compliance to the quota obligation has been consistently above 99%
since 2004 (the ￿rst year of full operation of the system), and as a result the fee is
scarcely applied.13 Another objective of a penalty fee is to limit the overall costs of
the support system and its impact on consumers. In the UK, suppliers may satisfy
their obligation by paying a so-called buy-out price to the regulatory authority. In
2007-2008, 36% of the renewable quota was not met and suppliers chose to pay the
buy-out price instead. This represented a total of £307M. These funds are later
channelled back to those suppliers that have ful￿lled their quotas (Ofgem 2009).
Poland has explicitly introduced a fee, which acts as a substitute to purchasing a
certi￿cate. This fee is lower than the penalty charge for non-compliance with the
quota. Generally, if the sanction should act as a deterrent it should be set high,
while if the aim is to provide a safety valve it should probably be set at a lower price
level.
In addition, half of the countries using certi￿cates complement their policy with
some form of more direct price control. Romania, for instance, de￿nes an interval
for the transaction value of the certi￿cate for the 2008-2014 period (thereafter a
penalty will act as a price ceiling), while Belgium guarantees a minimum price for
the certi￿cates. The purpose of a price ￿ oor is generally to ensure a minimum level
of support, and thereby return for the producers of renewable energy. It is a non-
negligible risk that the quota will be set at such a level that either the price ceiling
or the price ￿ oor will determine the price. This will imply that the certi￿cate system
translates into a price regulation, that is, a semi-￿xed feed-in tari⁄, thereby limiting
13In 2003 and 2004, there was a cap on the penalty fee (175SEK and 240SEK per missing
certi￿cate). However, the cap was removed in 2005 since it acted as a price ceiling on the certi￿cate
market and thereby directly in￿ uenced price formation (Swedish Energy Agency 2009)
34the advantages of this quantity instrument. Hence, the market is not allowed to
determine the required level of support, which in turn will inhibit the possibility to
achieve the targeted level of renewable power production.
Few countries o⁄er both feed-in tari⁄s and certi￿cates. In Italy, electricity gener-
ated from renewable energy sources is mainly promoted through a quota system. As
an alternative, small plants and expensive technologies like photovoltaics generation
can make use of price regulation in the form of feed-in tari⁄s. This targeted sup-
port on speci￿c technologies might be more cost-e¢ cient than participation in the
general certi￿cate system. Even though this combination of instruments is not con-
sistently used across the EU, it could be regarded as a ￿rst example of a sequencing
of support schemes according to the maturity of the technology.
Finally, well-adapted support schemes are only a necessary condition for the de-
velopment of renewable energy sources. Simplifying administrative procedures and
ensuring grid access can also in￿ uence investor decisions. In most Member States,
administrative procedures continue to be complicated, with multiple authorities re-
quiring consultation. Indicators have been deployed to monitor progress made by
Member States, such as the average number of authorities involved in the building
permission procedure or the average lead time for overall authorisation procedure
and grid connection. It is also evident that broad support in the society for the
development of renewable energy sources has proved to be important for the market
up-take of renewable technologies, as it has translated into a greater acceptance of
these technologies.
Policy conclusion 8 Most Member States have chosen feed-in tari⁄s over tradable
green certi￿cates. Latest developments in the design of feed-in tari⁄s tend to reduce
the overall cost of the policies and make them more compatible with the internal
market. In the meantime, the introduction of various price control mechanisms
tends to bring the characteristics of tradable green certi￿cates closer to those of a
price instrument, that is, a feed-in tari⁄.
5.2 Assessment of current levels of support schemes
Figure 7 describes, focusing on feed-in tari⁄s, Member States￿choices in terms of
level of support schemes. The diagrams denote the range of support levels for
di⁄erent technologies, that is, power production based on o⁄- and onshore wind,
small hydro, photovoltaic, solid and liquid biomass, biogas, and geothermal energy.
When a range is provided, the level of support will for example depend on the
size of the installation, the location, and/or the duration of the support. Annex
7.2 presents the same information, but in a table, and introduces as well a second
table with average support levels14. Figure 8 presents, for countries using feed-in
14 It is very di¢ cult to aggregate and compare the information regarding support scheme levels,
as conditions are both location and technology speci￿c. In addition, the level and design of support
35premiums, Member States￿current support levels.
Following the methodology presented in section 4, feed-in tari⁄s should be intro-
duced so as to optimally internalise all externalities associated with the production
of renewables. There are not any signi￿cant di⁄erences among renewables tech-
nologies in the way they internalise environmental externalities15, which calls for
a uniform treatment of pollution issues to determine optimal support levels. The
energy security risk is managed by supporting the development of a balanced, diver-
si￿ed and economically viable mix of energy technologies. Support schemes would
then have to consider the individual contribution of each renewable technology to
reducing the energy security risk. This may justify higher support levels for less
developed and less competitive technologies. Finally, di⁄erences in learning rates
could explain di⁄erent average levels of feed-in tari⁄s. It is for instance the case
between on-shore and o⁄-shore wind, due to earlier development of on-shore wind
technologies.
Overall, Figure 7 shows signi￿cant di⁄erences from Member State to Member
State in the relative support level given to various technologies. Although general
conclusion should be derived with caution, it seems very di¢ cult to justify these
di⁄erences by cost-e¢ cient internalisation of externalities at the Member State level.
In other words, although externalities are hard to measure, it is equally di¢ cult to
consider that they greatly di⁄er from Member State to Member State.
Let us now consider support levels by technology. As regards wind energy, the
market deployment of this technology is such that it can be quali￿ed as relatively
mature. At current cost levels, the feed-in tari⁄s range from 2.3 to 13 ecents/kWh,
with an average of 8.5 ecents/kWh. This average rate would guarantee a rent of
about 2 ecents, compared with production costs as given in the CASES project,
for each kWh of on-shore wind produced. As seen with Figures 3 and 4, expected
learning rates are modest beyond 2020. Considering that energy security risks are
marginal compared to learning rates, support is probably too high for on-shore wind
and would need to be fully phased out by 2020.
Expected learning rates appear to be rather low for both the biogas and solid
biomass technology, as the production cost ranges are expected to fall slightly or
even increase for biomass up to 2030. The feed-in tari⁄ rates for these technologies
range from 6 to 23 ecent/kWh, with averages around 10ecent for biomass and
11ecent for biogas. These rates can be assumed to internalise and compensate
for the expected learning rates over time, in particular beyond 2030. However, it
remains vital to ensure that learning by doing results in reduced production costs in
schemes evolve rapidly. Thus, general conclusions should be derived with caution. In 2010, Mem-
ber States will have to provide national renewable action plans, and as of 2011 they will report
biannually on the promotion and progress in the use of renewable energy. This process
15The only di⁄erence could come from the environmental externalities they themselves generate
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Figure 7: Feed-in tari⁄s in the EU per technology, ecent/kWh. (Source: European
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Figure 8: Premiums in the EU per technology, ecent/kWh. (Source: European
Commission (2009b) and http://res-legal.de)
38the longer term so that these technologies can reach market maturity in the future.
Furthermore, photovoltaic energy currently bene￿ts from very high support lev-
els due to high learning rates. These learning rates are expected to be high for this
technology in the next 20 years as production costs are expected to come down to a
third of current levels. However, according to Figures 3 and 4, solar energy produced
by photovoltaics will still have high relative costs and be far from competitive in
2030. One concern in this context is whether support to market deployment gen-
erates these learning e⁄ects in the most cost e¢ cient way, or if other instruments
which support technology development more directly, for example research grants,
would be more e¢ cient in order to internalise the spill-over e⁄ects. The security of
supply externality would be another basis for the support of photovoltaic energy.
However, the few empirical results attempting to measure energy security risks do
not allow concluding that the promotion of photovoltaic energy is a cost-e¢ cient
policy.
Concerning feed-in premiums, their level should be set so that they compen-
sate for the externalities of the individual technologies in addition to the electricity
price. In those countries that apply both a feed-in tari⁄ and a feed-in premium,
the di⁄erence between the two instruments should be the average expected elec-
tricity price. This appears to hold for most countries. However, the treatment of
wind energy in the Czech Republic seems to be an exception, as the premium ap-
pears rather generous vis-￿-vis both other technologies and other Member States.
Overall, the same analysis applies for the premiums as for the feed-in tari⁄s. As
wind energy approaches maturity, it should be possible to phase out the premiums
by 2020. Moreover, it is not evident that support to market deployment through
feed-in premiums is the most cost-e¢ cient way to promote photovoltaic energy.
The importance of keeping the overall costs down is vital in order to maintain
both political and public acceptance of the support schemes. Examples from Den-
mark16 and the Netherlands demonstrate that systems that are considered as too
generous and costly run the risk of being overhauled, which in turn risks having a
detrimental impact on the stability of and the con￿dence in the system and thereby
reduce investments.
Policy conclusion 9 Di⁄erences in support levels must be justi￿ed by di⁄erences
in each technology￿ s contribution to energy security or in each technology￿ s learning
rate. Overall, these considerations do not seem to be the main explanation for ob-
served variations in support levels across Member States. As regards wind energy,
support levels are probably too high. In addition, the current promotion of photo-
16Denmark shifted to FIT premiums in 2001 and support to R&D activities was cut. However,
the premium was set rather low, and as a consequence the pace of investment in the wind sector
slowed down.
39voltaics could possibly be more cost-e¢ cient if it targeted technology development
more directly.
6 Conclusion
Major barriers in the growth and integration of renewable electricity remain. By
adopting well-adapted instruments and combining di⁄erent types of support mea-
sures, Member States can continue to improve their e⁄orts to support renewable
energy with the ambition to reach the agreed targets in an e¢ cient way. How-
ever, greater clarity on issues relating to design and implementation of the support
schemes could be useful in order to improve e¢ ciency. In that context, the following
conclusions have been derived:
￿ Given relative production and external costs, policies that solely aim to inter-
nalise environmental externalities are unlikely to make the renewable power
technologies competitive. Besides, the costs of energy security are unlikely to
motivate, by themselves, ambitious renewable policies. Hence, it is the combi-
nation of all three externalities, pollution, energy security and learning e⁄ects,
that would justify a strong policy intervention. In designing appropriate sup-
port schemes, the main challenge is to measure adequately these externalities,
and in particular spill-over rates, in order to determine optimal intervention
levels.
￿ By guaranteeing the price and providing a secure demand, feed-in tari⁄s create
certainty for the investor regarding the rate of return. However, they also risk
inducing a high burden on consumers when production cost estimates are
incorrect. Hence, they should be time-limited to keep rents and the overall
costs for consumers down, and frequently reviewed to adjust the system to the
latest available information. Certi￿cates should in theory limit the costs on
consumers as the level of support is determined on the market. However, this
feature also induces a market risk for producers, which has proved not to be
conducive to investments in new capacity.
￿ To limit internal market distortions, feed-in premiums should be preferred over
feed-in tari⁄s.
￿ The support scheme should ￿t the level of development of the technology. A
solution may be to sequence instruments according to the maturity of the
technology. Feed-in premiums can be used for technologies at the early stage
of market deployment. Once the volumes start to have an impact on the
internal market and the technology approaches competitiveness, tradable green
certi￿cates would be a more suitable support instrument.
40￿ Harmonisation of support schemes would equalise marginal production costs
across the EU and thereby minimise the cost of the policy. However, harmon-
isation based on a common certi￿cate system would run the risk of mainly
supporting mature technologies, unless it is limited to technologies with sim-
ilar levels of development. Another concern is that local environmental and
regional development bene￿ts will not accrue to the country granting the sup-
port. Finally, an optimal allocation of renewable power production is depen-
dent on well-functioning and competitive electricity and certi￿cate markets.
￿ Most Member States have chosen feed-in tari⁄s over tradable green certi￿-
cates. Latest developments in the design of feed-in tari⁄s tend to reduce the
overall cost of the policies and make them more compatible with the internal
market, for example through applying a feed-in premium. In the meantime,
the introduction of price controls tends to bring the characteristics of tradable
green certi￿cates closer to those of a price instrument.
￿ Di⁄erences in support levels must be justi￿ed by di⁄erences in each technol-
ogy￿ s contribution to energy security and/or in each technology￿ s learning rate.
Overall, it does not seem to be the main explanation for observed variations
in support levels across Member States. As regards wind energy, the available
estimates of externalities suggest that support levels are probably too high
in many countries. In addition, the current promotion of photovoltaics could
possibly be more cost-e¢ cient if it targeted technology development more di-
rectly.
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Biogas 55 ￿215 50 ￿200 50 - 190
Solid biomass 80 ￿195 85 ￿200 85 - 205
Photovoltaic 520 - 880 270 ￿460 170 - 300
Wind on-shore farm 75 ￿110 55 ￿90 50 - 85
Wind o⁄-shore farm 85 ￿140 65 ￿115 50 - 95
Small scale hydro 60 ￿185 55 ￿160 50 - 145
Large scale hydro 35 ￿145 30 ￿140 30 - 130
Nuclear 50 ￿85 45 ￿80 45 - 80
Gas (Combined cycle gas
turbine)
50 ￿60 65 ￿75 70 - 80
Coal (Pulverised Coal Com-
bustion)
40 ￿50 65 ￿80 65 - 80
Electricity prices, wholesale 51-74
Source: European Commission (2008a)
7.2 Feed-in tari⁄s in the EU per technology
Figure 10 presents current levels of support schemes per Member State and per
technology. Figure 11 presents the results of our estimates of average levels of
support schemes by technologies and by Member States. These averages have simply
been determined by calculating the average support level per technology and per
Member State. Hence, on average, the level of feed-in tari⁄s o⁄ered by Member
States to promote renewable technologies goes from 7 cte/kWh for land￿ll gas to
31.8 cte/kWh for photovoltaics. There exists a di⁄erence in the average level of
support between wind on-shore and wind o⁄-shore. There is also a slight di⁄erence
between biomass technologies. Small hydro receives relatively low support whereas
biogas and, to some extent, geothermal receive relatively high supports.
44Figure 9: Private and external production costs of electricity generation by technol-
ogy, eurocents/kWh (Source: CASES, 2009)
45Figure 10: 2009 level of support schemes in Member States. Source: European
Commission (2009b) and http://res-legal.d
46Figure 11: 2009 average levels of support schemes in Member States (Source: own
calculations)
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8.1 Determination of optimal renewable policies
8.1.1 Scenario 1: environmental externality only
The optimal feed-in tari⁄ is determined by backward induction, that is, ￿rst by
determining optimal production levels given the tari⁄ and then by solving the reg-
ulator￿ s welfare maximisation decision. Given the support scheme policy, ￿rms in
the renewable sector maximise the following pro￿t function:
(25) Max￿
R = ￿q1 ￿ G1(q1)
First order conditions of pro￿t maximisation are, for both periods:
(26) ￿ = G
0
1(q1)
Firms in the fossil fuel sector maximise the following pro￿t function:
(27) Max￿
F = P1x1 + (P1 ￿ ￿)nq1 ￿ C(x1)
They consider the electricity price and the add-on cost due to the support scheme
as given. However, as the price of electricity is endogenous, fossil-fuel based power
producers will be a⁄ected. First order conditions of pro￿t maximisation are, for
both periods:
(28) P1 = C
0(x1)
Second order conditions are always satis￿ed. Totally di⁄erentiating ￿rst order



















48In other words, an increase in the feed-in tari⁄ will increase the renewable-
based electricity production and decrease the fossil-fuel based electricity production.
















which, using ￿rst order conditions of pro￿t maximisation, can be rearranged to
give the optimal policy level.
8.1.2 Scenario 3: learning-by doing only
The pro￿t maximisation problem for ￿rms in the renewables sector is:
(32) Max￿
R = ￿q1 ￿ G1(q1) + ￿[p2q2 ￿ G2(q2;L)]













Recall that ￿rms in the renewable sector only consider their own impact on
learning, not the one provided by production levels of the other ￿rms in the sector.
So, spillover aspects are not considered when ￿rms maximise their pro￿ts. First-
order conditions of pro￿t maximisation in the fossil-fuel based sector are as usual.
Note that the feed-in tari⁄a⁄ects prices in period 1 and 2 and therefore production

















































2 ￿ nP 0
2(Q2)
49Maximising welfare with respect to the feed-in tari⁄ is given by:
dWLBD
d￿































which, using the envelope theorem, can be simpli￿ed to obtain the optimal feed-
in tari⁄.
8.1.3 Scenario 4: combining pollution and learning-by doing
Firms in the fossil-fuel based electricity sector maximise the following pro￿t function:
(36) Max￿
F = P1x1 + (P1 ￿ ￿)nq1 ￿ C(x1) ￿ ￿￿x1
The ￿rst-order condition of pro￿t maximisation is:
(37) P1 = C
0(x1) + ￿
Maximising welfare with respect to the pollution tax supposes that:
dWPoll+LBD
d￿

































Using the envelope theorem, we have:
dWPoll+LBD
d￿

































The solution to this system of equations is to set equal to zero each one of the
two terms in both equations. This gives the optimal levels of policy intervention.
8.1.4 Scenario 5: Combining learning-by doing and energy security
Welfare optimisation conditions would be:
dWES+LBD
d￿














































































8.1.5 Scenario 6: Combining all three externalities
Using a tax rate on fossil fuel based electricity producers and a feed-in tari⁄, welfare
optimisation conditions are given by:
51dW
d#





















































































The objective of this section is to illustrate with a simple example the main theo-
retical results identi￿ed in section 3. Due to the overall simplicity of the approach,
it cannot be used as an attempt to calibrate the model. In this section, any demand
e⁄ect is ruled out. We assume that at the market price, electricity producers can sell
as much electricity as they want, and that the feed-in tari⁄ only implies a transfer
between producers and consumers and thus there is no net e⁄ect on welfare. This
has an important consequence: because the price of electricity (before feed-in tari⁄s)
is exogenous, feed-in tari⁄s cannot in￿ uence the production decisions of fossil-fuel
based power producers. Thus, in this case, no feed-in tari⁄ can internalise the en-
vironmental externality. Therefore, we can directly move to the consideration of an
optimal feed-in tari⁄ in presence of learning by doing.
8.2.1 Determining optimal feed-in tari⁄s in presence of learning by do-
ing
Equations de￿ning the model First, let us introduce speci￿c production cost
functions, while recalling the learning rate equation: C1 = c
x2
1
2 , C2 = c
x2
2







￿)2 and L = q1 + ￿(n ￿ 1)q1. Based on these production cost
52functions, and recalling that the underlying price of electricity is now exogenously
given and equal to m, production levels of the fossil fuel sector are easily determined:
x1 = m
c and x2 = m










2 ￿ ￿￿ + n￿￿
(48)
Overall production levels are then given as follows: Q1 = x1 + nq1 and Q2 =
x2 + nq2. The optimal welfare, taking account of the two periods, is such that:
(49) W = mQ1 ￿ C1 ￿ nG1 + ￿(mQ2 ￿ C2 ￿ nG2)
Welfare is optimised when the ￿rst derivative with respect to the feed in tari⁄￿
is equal to zero. In this context, the solution is:
(50) ￿LBD =
m￿ + 4m￿
2 ￿ m￿￿ + mn￿￿ ￿ 2m￿￿￿ + 2mn￿￿￿
￿ + 4￿
2 ￿ 2￿￿ + ￿￿2 + n2￿￿2 + 2n￿￿ ￿ 2n￿￿2
The optimal feed-in tari⁄depends on the electricity price, on the number of ￿rms,
on the discount parameter, on the in￿ uence of learning on future costs, and on the
spillover rate. We note as well that the optimal feed-in tari⁄ does not depend on
production costs in the fossil-fuel based electricity sector. Some sensitivity analysis
can be performed in order to check the robustness of the results.
Sensitivity analysis By default, the following speci￿c values are given to the
parameters: n = 10, c = 48, m = 60, ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 50 and ￿ = 0:95. Given these
parameter values, the optimal feed-in tari⁄ is equal to: 62:418:
Sensitivity as regards the number of renewable ￿rms n The optimal
tari⁄ as a function of n is presented in the following graph.









Optimal feed-in tari⁄ as a function of the number of ￿rms
If there is only one ￿rm in the renewable industry, all learning e⁄ects are inter-
nalised and so there is no need for policy intervention. Thus, the optimal tari⁄ is
equal to the electricity price. As the number of ￿rms increases, the spillover e⁄ects
become more important and so the optimal tari⁄ increases. The following graph
presents the elasticity of the feed-in tari⁄ to a change in the number of ￿rms.














Elasticity of feed-in tari⁄ to a change in the number of ￿rms
54As the number of ￿rms increases, the optimal feed-in tari⁄becomes more elastic
to a change in n. Intuitively, as n increases, spillover e⁄ects become major issues,
which forces the regulator to adjust all the more the optimal tari⁄ to any change in
n.
Sensitivity as regards the spillover rate, ￿ Similar interpretations can be
conducted as regards the spillover rate. Optimal feed-in tari⁄s increase with the
spill-over rate, so as to increase the incentives for cost reductions. The variation in
the elasticity of the feed-in tari⁄to a change in the spillover rate has the same shape
than in the case of n. The intuition is identical to the one associated with a change
in n.
Sensitivity as regards the discount rate ￿ Similar results are obtained
when looking at the in￿ uence of a change in ￿. The more the regulator also considers
welfare in period 2, the higher the incentives to increase the feed-in tari⁄. The
following graph indicates however that the optimal tari⁄is less sensitive to a change
in ￿ than to a change in the other parameters of the model.














Elasticity of the feed-in tari⁄ to a change in the discount rate
8.2.2 Determining optimal feed-in tari⁄s in presence of an energy secu-
rity externality
Equations de￿ning the model Most of the equations used in the previous sim-
ulations apply here. The only di⁄erence is the absence of learning-by doing but
55the presence of an energy security externality. To keep things comparable, we con-
sider that there is no energy security risk in the second period. The energy security
damage function is modelled as follows:
(51) s1 = ￿(s ￿ nq1)
2
where s is an optimal volume of renewables exogenously given and ￿ is the
probability (or frequency) of the energy security damage. ￿ = 0 would signify
that a sub-optimal level of renewables would not induce any energy security cost.
￿ = 1 would on the other hand create an energy security cost with certainty. The
production level in the ￿rst period is given by the following equation: q1 = ￿
2. In the
second period, it is equal to the electricity price. Welfare is given by the following
equation:
(52) W = mQ1 ￿ C1 ￿ nG1 ￿ s1 + ￿(mQ2 ￿ C2 ￿ nG2)






In the context of this model, the optimal feed-in tari⁄ is equal to the electricity
price when the optimal level of renewable production is 300: For an optimal level of
renewables lower than this value, the optimal feed-in tari⁄will fall short of the elec-
tricity price, so as to reduce renewable energy production, and conversely. Assuming
￿ = 0:01 and s = 400, the optimal feed-in tari⁄ is then equal to: 61:818
Comparative statics A change in ￿ can increase or decrease the optimal feed-
in tari⁄s, depending on the optimal level of renewable electricity. If the level of
renewable electricity produced at the electricity market price is too low (resp. high)
compared to the optimal level of renewables, then the optimal feed-in tari⁄s increases
(resp. decreases) in ￿. This is explained by the fact that the optimal feed-in tari⁄
is higher (resp. lower) than the electricity price if the level of renewable electricity
produced is initially too low (resp. high).
Clearly, an increase in the optimal level of renewable energy production has a
non-ambiguous positive impact on the optimal feed-in tari⁄. The following graph
presents the variation in the tari⁄ as a function of s. This graph is determined
assuming that ￿ = 0:01, that is, that the probability of an energy security damage
is 1%.
￿ = 1
n￿+1 (m + 2s￿)











Optimal feed-in tari⁄ as a function of the optimal level of renewables
8.2.3 Determining optimal tari⁄s in presence of learning-by doing as
well as energy security risk
Optimal tari⁄ Welfare in this context takes account of learning-by doing e⁄ects
in the renewable energy industry as well as the energy security issue. Welfare is
optimised when the ￿rst derivative with respect to the control variable is equal to
zero. The optimal tari⁄ is then:
￿LBD+ES =
m￿ + 4m￿
2 ￿ m￿￿ + 2s￿￿ + 8s￿
2￿ + mn￿￿
￿ + 4￿
2 ￿ 2￿￿ + ￿￿2 + n2￿￿2 + 2n￿￿ + 4n￿
2￿ ￿ 2n￿￿2 (54)
￿
2m￿￿￿ + 2s￿￿￿ + 2mn￿￿￿ ￿ 2mn￿￿￿ ￿ 2ns￿￿￿
￿ + 4￿
2 ￿ 2￿￿ + ￿￿2 + n2￿￿2 + 2n￿￿ + 4n￿
2￿ ￿ 2n￿￿2
The comparative statics are not signi￿cantly modi￿ed compared to the situation
where there was only one externality considered. Using the same parameter values
as in the previous two sections, the optimal feed-in tari⁄ is: 63:963. The two
externalities reinforce each other, which increases the optimal feed-in tari⁄. In other
words, if the regulator was to consider only one of these externalities, the production
of renewables would be too low.
Welfare comparison The following graphs present the welfare considered previ-
ously for various optimal values s of renewable electricity production. The dotted
lines represent welfare when there is only an energy security externality, the black
57solid lines represent welfare in the presence of learning-by doing and the dashed lines
represent welfare when combining the two externalities.
The black solid lines are clearly not a⁄ected by a change in s. It is shown however
that in the other two scenarios, the optimal tari⁄ increases as s increases. Initially,
the feed-in tari⁄ had to be set relatively low so as to avoid too much production
of renewables. As s increases, renewable electricity is more and more valued, from
an energy security point of view, and therefore the optimal tari⁄ increases. Note
that the optimal tari⁄in the presence of both externalities is always higher than the
tari⁄ with only the energy security externality. It is because all else being equal,
there is always an incentive to push for a higher production of renewables in the
￿rst period so as to decrease production costs in the second period.
Finally, it is also important to note that whatever the context, welfare in the
presence of two externalities and only one instrument to regulate them is always
lower than welfare in the presence of a single externality. Even though it is not
discussed here, the presence of a single externality may mean that the other ex-
ternalities are already regulated by other policy instruments. In this case, this
reinforces the argument for a combination of instruments in order to regulate the
renewable-based electricity sector. Support schemes alone cannot optimally control
for energy security risk, learning curve e⁄ects, as well as environmental damage.
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